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Abstract
Although the American public is divided on many policies, the majority of
Americans (commonly close to 60%) continue to support a relatively controversial form
of military technology: lethal drone strikes used to target terrorists in foreign countries.
This study seeks to determine what factors affect American public approval of lethal
drone strikes and which factor yields the greatest impact on support. Four main
arguments for and against drone strikes are explored—military effectiveness, military
ineffectiveness, violations of international law, and increased ease of military
intervention. Employing a survey experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I find that
international law concerns produce the most substantial negative impact on approval; that
is, respondents exposed to the International Law treatment are the most likely to
disapprove of US usage of lethal drone strikes. The other experimental conditions
resulted in slight increases in approval; however, the degree of these changes is relatively
inconsequential. This study also shows that identification as a Republican,
Hispanic/Latino origin, prior service in the armed forces, and having a relationship to
someone who has served in the military are the most significant predictors of approval.
Conversely, females are significantly more likely to disapprove of lethal drone strikes.
These findings answer questions about not only what underpins public attitudes regarding
lethal drone strikes, but also how these determinants could apply to public approval of
increasingly autonomous weaponry systems.
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“The program is not perfect. No military program is. But here is the bottom line:
It works. I think it is fair to say that the targeted killing program has been the most
precise and effective application of firepower in the history of armed conflict. It disrupted
terrorist plots and reduced the original Qaeda organization along the AfghanistanPakistan border to a shell of its former self.”
– Michael V. Hayden, 2016 New
York Times article, “To Keep America Safe,
Embrace Drone Warfare”
"[W]hen counterterrorism efforts neglect the rule of law at the national and international
levels and violate international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and
fundamental freedoms, they not only betray the values they seek to uphold, but they can
also fuel violent extremism...”
– Maleeha Lodhi, July 2016 speech
th
to 110 plenary meeting of United Nations’
General Assembly Seventieth Session

Introduction
In the current age of increasingly polarized partisan politics, issues that enjoy a
majority of American public support across party lines have become rare. In spite of this,
in a national survey conducted by Pew Research Center in May 2015, 58% of the
American public approved of US usage of lethal drone strikes to target terrorists in
foreign countries while only 35% disapproved, which indicates a relatively high level of
support for a single issue (Pew Research Center, 2015). Moreover, although Republicans
are often found to be more likely to approve of missile strikes from drones than
Democrats, the issue also possesses a high level of bipartisan support. This situation thus
appears quite odd—in a political system in which fissures in American public support are
the norm, why are so many Americans supportive of lethal drone strikes? An interesting
wrinkle also emerges in the results of a 2017 Pew Research Center survey, which reveals
that about 48% of Americans say that the use of military force against countries that may
threaten the US, but have not yet attacked, can rarely or never be justified (Pew Research
5

Center, 2017). This appears to clash with the use of lethal drone strikes, which often
involves preemptive attacks on countries with which the US is not involved in any direct
military confrontation such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. In an attempt to resolve
this discrepancy, the question thus becomes, what are the individual-level factors that
affect American public support for lethal drone strikes? Moreover, which of those factors
shape Americans’ views about lethal drone strikes most strongly?
The use of drones in warfare offers a particularly appealing allure because by
substituting capital for labor, drones reduce the number of lives risked in combat, which
minimizes the risk of soldier casualty to zero. When formulating their opinions regarding
the use of military force, Americans often conduct an internal cost-benefit calculus. By
eliminating the possibility of American soldier casualties from such a calculation, the
benefits of a military operation can be achieved in a much safer and lower-cost way. This
means that for many Americans, the US can pursue its national objectives without putting
any American soldiers in harm’s way. Thus, casualty aversion appears to form the
foundation for American approval of lethal drones strikes. However, lethal drone strikes
possess negative consequences as well, some of which the American public may be
unaware. Thus, upon being presented with potential drawbacks of drones, one will be
able to assess which of these negative consequences undermines support for lethal drone
strikes most strongly. Since such unmanned airstrikes could revolutionize the nature of
warfare, it is critical to gain a deeper understanding of which factors exert the greatest
impact on American public approval. Moreover, a closer analysis of individual-level
factors can help to assess the durability of American public support for lethal drone
strikes. That is, is public approval of drones so high because the American public lacks
all the requisite information about potential drawbacks to make a fully informed
6

judgment, or are drones a compelling enough form of military technology that Americans
are willing to approve of their usage, regardless of the consequences?
Accordingly, a main objective of this project is to identify which factors most
strongly influence American public support for lethal drone strikes used to target
terrorists in foreign countries. That is, when respondents are presented with different
consequences of lethal drone strikes, which factor will be most effective in altering levels
of public support? The findings of this study also attempt to fill a gap in the existing
literature surrounding lethal drone strikes. Much of the existing literature tends to focus
on drones’ technological capabilities, current trends in drone proliferation, and debates
over whether drones should be considered a transformative technology worthy of being
incorporated as the central feature of US military strategy. Although many scholars have
investigated the negative drawbacks of lethal drone strikes, few pieces of existing
scholarship explore the connection between different consequences of drone warfare and
public approval. Also, in order to determine whether drones are a unique military
weaponry development that could fundamentally change the relationship between public
opinion and the use of military force, this project seeks to compare American public
support for unmanned airstrikes by drones and manned airstrikes.
This study employs a survey experiment designed to assess which factor, either
positive or negative, yields the greatest impact on Americans’ approval of lethal drone
strikes. Respondents are recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and they are
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions—Militarily Effective,
Militarily Ineffective, International Law, and Increased Ease of Military Intervention. All
of the conditions present respondents with the same hypothetical scenario in which the
United States discovers a group of extremists operating in a small village in Pakistan;
7

this group is suspected to possess plans to attack the US. Accordingly, the US is planning
to launch lethal drone strikes to eliminate these extremists. In addition to this general
prompt, each experimental condition contains a treatment wherein respondents receive a
statement highlighting either a benefit or drawback of lethal drone strikes. In the
Militarily Effective condition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claims that the strikes have been
critical in eliminating extremists and making Americans safer. The Militarily Ineffective
condition utilizes the authority of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations
such as Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights and Counterterrorism to claim that lethal drone strikes trigger anti-US sentiment,
which allows extremist groups to recruit new members. Consequently, the Militarily
Ineffective condition states that drone strikes may actually make Americans less safe. In
the International Law condition, the same organizations from the Militarily Ineffective
condition indicate that lethal drone strikes violate international law in two ways. First,
drone strikes violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state in which the
attack takes place. Second, these organizations argue that drone strikes fail to take
necessary measures to prevent civilian casualties. The Increased Ease of Military
Intervention condition highlights the argument that the ability to conduct strikes without
risk to American lives lowers the threshold for authorizing lethal military operations,
which could increase the frequency of American military intervention worldwide. Also,
since drone strikes can be executed with the push of a button, they could make it too easy
to kill human beings.
The results of this study show that the International Law condition yields the
greatest negative impact on American public approval of lethal drone strikes. Although
none of the experimental conditions produce statistically significant results,
8

international law concerns most strongly influence respondents to become less approving
of lethal drone strikes. This finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating
the resonance of international law concerns with the American public (Kreps and
Wallace, 2016). Interestingly, both the Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of
Military Intervention conditions increase the likelihood of approval, albeit very slightly.
An increase in approval under the Militarily Ineffective condition could be due to
patriotic distrust of intergovernmental organizations, which could be shaped by the
current Trump administration. Also, the results show that partisan identification as a
Republican, Hispanic/Latino origin, prior service in the armed forces, and having a
relationship with someone who has served in the armed forces are the most significant
predictors of increased approval of lethal drone strikes. Conversely, females are
significantly less likely to approve of lethal drone strikes, which mirrors findings from
previous studies investigating the relationship between gender and support for military
force more generally. Neither age nor level of education is a significant indicator of
approval.
The results of this project will not only be relevant for understanding which
factors impact public support for drone strikes most strongly, but also for investigating
future trends in American public opinion regarding the use of military force, especially
when implemented via increasingly autonomous weaponry systems. First, this work
inspires future research into the continued relevance of just war theory on public attitudes
regarding the use of military force. That is, as means of warfare create more distance
between the combatant and the battlefield, future studies could investigate whether
fighting and killing with “honor” are still major concerns for the American public. With
the advent of such technology, do Americans still care about fighting in a “just” way?
9

Moreover, these ethical concerns can be further expanded with the study of public
opinion regarding autonomous weapons systems such as killer robots. Autonomous
weapons systems not only widen the gap between the combatant and the battlefield, but
they also possess the potential to remove the human factor in decision-making altogether.
Although completely autonomous systems do not yet exist, future research can examine
whether the public’s desire for the elimination of American casualties will result in a
willingness to support a form of technology in which humans no longer conduct or
oversee the mission. Such an inquiry could produce findings relevant to both academic
literature and the future direction of public policy. Furthermore, researchers can study
whether these findings apply to other countries or if the results of this cost-benefit
calculus represent a uniquely American phenomenon.
Finally, future research can investigate how the Trump administration has
affected the impact of international law concerns on public attitudes regarding warfare.
President Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, which often criticizes the value of
multilateral agreements, appears to signal his disdain for the supposed “interference” of
international organizations in American affairs. Thus, his critiques of the United Nations,
which functions as the primary body for the creation and dissemination of international
law norms, could damage American public opinion regarding the UN’s legitimacy and
authority. Future work can thus investigate whether the adoption of such beliefs will
reduce the impact of international law concerns on public attitudes regarding use of
military force. Will other factors become more influential in the public’s approval of
military technology such as lethal drone strikes?
More broadly, as military technology begins to rely less on direct military
intervention achieved through “boots on the ground,” one must consider what the
10

implications of this shift will be for democratic decision-making. Since lethal drone
strikes do not require a formal declaration of war, which is debated in Congress, will
American military decision-making become even less transparent? If so, could this render
the influence of American public opinion on the direction of foreign policy increasingly
irrelevant? Overall, this study provides a starting point for future research not only on
public attitudes regarding drones but also the potentially broader consequences of the rise
of new forms of military technology.

Background and Related Scholarship
Part I. Existing Literature on Drones
What is a drone?
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, are aerial
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator. Drones can be
categorized according to their intended usage and level of technological capability. First,
UAVs can be either armed or unarmed. Whereas unarmed drones can only be used for
surveillance missions, armed drones can carry out lethal missions as well as conduct
surveillance (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2017). Second, there are two basic types of
drones—advanced and basic. Advanced drones possess significant loitering capabilities
in which they can stay in the air for at least 20 hours, operate at an altitude of at least
16,000 feet, and withstand a maximum takeoff weight of at least 1,320 pounds. UAVs
with a higher technological capacity can be characterized by more advanced mission
equipment such as gyro-stabilized high-power telescopes, laser designators, synthetic
aperture radars, and precision munitions. Since requirements for target recognition and
11

successful attacks demand high levels of capital for development, typically only wealthy
and technologically advanced countries such as the US and Israel can manufacture such
advanced systems. Examples of advanced drones include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9
Reaper, and RQ-7 Shadow, which are commonly deployed by the US. Basic drones, on
the other hand, offer a shorter range and typically contain less sophisticated technology.
Some lower technology systems such as the Iranian Ababil use basic radio remote control
to allow unmanned flight and video recording, yet such aircraft are highly susceptible to
being shot down, jamming, or interception. Additionally, shorter-range systems, often
only capable of flight for up to 300 kilometers, are commonly used for loitering and
operating autonomously in enemy territory, which is described as “swarming use” (Davis
et al., 2014). This study will focus on advanced, armed drones used to carry out precision
strikes.
Although armed drones are a more recent phenomenon, unarmed drones have
been utilized for surveillance since the 1960s, emerging out of a growing desire to
overcome the vulnerability of piloted aircraft. For example, the US deployed Firebee
UAVs to conduct surveillance during the Vietnam War and later relied upon unarmed
Predators for surveillance in the 1990s Balkans war (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann,
2016). Armed drone strikes began to emerge as a means for conducting precision strikes
against high-value targets in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks (Fuhrmann
and Horowitz, 2017). Whereas the US commonly utilizes the Reaper and Predator, both
of which are armed and capable of flying long distances at medium altitudes to conduct a
strike, the majority of other countries’ militaries possess unarmed drones, which are used
for surveillance purposes. Almost ninety countries possess military drones of some kind,
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yet the majority does not possess armed and advanced drones (Horowitz, Kreps, and
Fuhrmann, 2016).

Drone proliferation
Despite their capital-intensive nature, drone programs have begun to spread
internationally as more countries strive to develop their own armed drone fleets. As to be
expected from the world’s foremost military power, US UAV procurement and R&D
accounted for more than 50% of the total amount spent worldwide on military UAV
procurement and R&D in 2014 (Davis et al., 2014). In 2013, the US was estimated to
possess about 7,500 drones in operation, including a wide range of both smaller,
surveillance-based drones as well as larger, lethal drones used for targeted killings. By
comparison, China, which is considered the world’s second largest producer of drones,
trailed behind the US by at least several thousand drones (Boyle, 2014). However, a 2014
study by the RAND Corporation projects US spending on drones to remain relatively
constant over time and to not increase significantly from 2018 to 2022; this projection
remains subject to change depending on policies set by presidential administrations. Also,
despite its current preeminence in amount of drones, technological range, and strike
capacity, the US is no longer the world’s leading exporter of drones. Instead, Israel has
become the dominant exporter of drones for both domestic and military uses (Boyle,
2014). Thus, although the US has been the leading actor in the field of drones so far, the
proliferation of drone technology throughout the international system portends America’s
waning comparative advantage.
Looking beyond the US, the development and use of drones has exploded in
recent years. For example, between 2004 and 2011, the number of states with active
13

UAV programs doubled, from 40 states to over 80 (Boyle, 2014). By the end of 2014,
twenty-seven countries possessed advanced drones, seven countries possessed armed
drones, and almost twenty-four other countries were reported to have plans for
developing lethal UAV capability (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2017). Also, there has been
a gradual increase in spending on UAV procurement and R&D by the rest of the world. A
RAND study in 2014 found that China, India, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United
Arab Emirates were reportedly developing Category I systems, which encompass
medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs designed for surveillance, target acquisition,
reconnaissance, and attack. Moreover, the same study determined that Israel, Pakistan,
and South Africa sought to develop Category II systems, which possess a similar range to
Category I yet carry a lighter payload (Davis et al., 2014).
Beyond just building up their own drone arsenals to be used for security, countries
such as China and Russia have dedicated themselves to catching up to the US in research
and development for drone technology. In particular, China wishes to become the world’s
predominant exporter in the drone market. Over the past few years, China has sought to
establish itself as an alternative manufacturer of armed drones, producing UAVs such as
the CH-3 and Wing Loong. Currently, Chinese drones lack the same navigational
capabilities, weaponry payload, and range as US drones, but the Chinese UAV program
continues to actively improve (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016). The Chinese
development of a widespread, sophisticated drone program raises potential concerns for
the fate of the international system. US exports of drones are currently constrained by
American involvement in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which limits the sale
and export of heavy payload weapons, and the Wassenaar Agreement, which requires
participants to disclose information about their deliveries. As a result, despite its
14

leading role in technological capacity and R&D, the US does not actually sell that many
drones on the international market, and when it does, most of these weapons are sold to
NATO allies (Boyle, 2014). In comparison, China possesses no such restrictions on drone
sales, enabling it to sell weaponry to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria,
which are countries to which the US has refused to export (Boyle, 2014). Thus, by
potentially selling to erratic countries and non-state actors, China’s role as a rising
exporter in drone sales could lead to an increase in tension and violent conflicts
worldwide. An example of this can already be observed in 2015 when China supplied
Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan with armed drones, which were employed against domestic
insurgents (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016). Unfortunately, the sale of lethal
drones to a broader range of countries represents only one of many concerns about drone
proliferation.
In his 2014 article, “The Race for Drones,” Michael Boyle presents three primary
consequences of drone proliferation within the international system. As a premise for his
argument, Boyle suggests that states developing drones will likely not use them in the
same manner as the US, that is, as a means of targeted killing of suspected terrorists.
Rather, these countries will most likely use drones in order to gain an advantage in their
regional rivalries (Boyle, 2014). Building upon this supposition, Boyle first posits that
drone proliferation will result in a redefinition of the rules and norms governing
surveillance and reconnaissance. Although this could be beneficial in the short-term by
improving the flow of information between countries and reducing the risk of
miscalculation, Boyle argues that in the long-term, such an improved flow of information
could be lead to the development of more aggressive and riskier countermeasures to stop
drone surveillance. That is, in order to ensure the secrecy of their activities, states
15

being targeted by drones could utilize more aggressive means of protection such as
shooting down drones in their airspace. Moreover, despite an initial increase in
transparency, drone proliferation could ultimately lead to greater opaqueness as states
implement radar systems to block surveillance, which would lead to greater information
asymmetry and uncertainty. Second, since they are a low-cost and low-risk form of
technology, Boyle claims that governments will use drones to test the strategic
commitment of their rivals, which could undermine the deterrence inherent in many tense
regional relationships. An example of this phenomenon can be observed in 2013 when
China deployed drones over the contested Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea as a
means of testing Japan’s commitment to controlling the territory. When Japan threatened
to shoot the drones down, China stated that such an action would denote an act of war,
which ratcheted up the preexisting level of tension in their relationship. Since drones do
not possess the potential for loss of a human pilot, many governments might regard the
shoot down of a drone as a negligible loss, yet such a response could lead to the rapid
escalation of conflict. Finally, Boyle also outlines the concern that drone proliferation
could lead to an increased risk of conflict spirals stemming from accidents or hijacked
drones. As drone usage becomes more diffuse throughout society, it becomes more
difficult to control where drones fly and prevent them from colliding with civilian
aircraft, which could result in casualties. In response to these consequences, Boyle
suggests restricting the sale of sophisticated drones, banning certain countries involved in
regional rivalries from purchasing drones, applying user-end agreements that regulate
how drones are used once purchased, and pursuing US-led efforts to establish norms for
the use and sale of drones abroad (Boyle, 2014).
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Other scholars advance concerns about drone proliferation due to the dual-use
nature of drone technology, which could raise significant regulatory challenges. Drones
are considered a form of dual-use technology because they can be utilized in both
military and civilian settings. Unlike Boyle and other scholars who assume that dronerelated problems could be managed if there were broader state-level agreement
surrounding the enactment of regulations, Marcus Schulzke argues for the acceptance of
drones as an immovable feature of war, the negative effects of which should be contained
(Schulzke, 2018). He claims that drones are often difficult to regulate because they are
dual-use in a more expansive sense than other technologies, the drone market is open to a
more diverse array of actors, which makes the restriction of usage more difficult, and
greater familiarity with drones in civilian life increases citizens’ support for armed drones
(Schulzke, 2018). This final item raises an interesting point—in today’s society wherein
average citizens interact with drones much more frequently, this familiarity can translate
to higher levels of trust and confidence in the technology. Consequently, higher levels of
trust can lead to greater support for arming drones (Schulzke, 2018). In light of these
concerns, Schulzke advocates for an alternative solution to the consequences of drone
proliferation wherein restrictions should seek to moderate the pace of development rather
than attempting to stop it entirely or impose an overly elaborate system of regulatory
mechanisms.

Drones: transformative technology or nothing too special?
Amidst weighing the benefits of drone warfare with concerns about potential
drawbacks, a central question has risen to prominence in the existing literature on
drones—should drones be considered a transformative technology or are drones just
17

another option in a country’s array of military capabilities? For some analysts, drones
represent a “revolutionary military technology” capable of fundamentally altering the use
of violence by both state and non-state actors. The driving force behind such an argument
is that drones lower the costs of using military force. According to Horowitz, Kreps, and
Fuhrmann, “drones change decision-making because they do not inherently risk the life
and limb of the user” (2016). Thus, for many scholars, drones represent a breakthrough in
military weaponry by providing military leaders and policymakers with a low-cost, lowrisk technological option.
Furthermore, drones can be considered transformative technology due to their
enhanced capability for coercion. Although scholars such as Schelling would claim that
credible threats rely upon the conveyance of costly signals, others argue that drones offer
threat credibility through cheap fighting rather than costly signaling (Zegart, 2018).
Traditional political theory claims that signals are thought to be more credible and costly
if they invoke blood (loss of human life), treasure (high financial costs), or reputation
(high international or domestic costs). However, drones deviate from this usage by
offering a low-cost, low-risk alternative. Drones offer three unexpected coercion
advantages—first, sustainability in long duration conflicts; second, certainty of precision
punishment, which can change the psychology of the adversary; and third, shifts in the
relative costs of war (Zegart, 2018). Zegart emphasizes the importance of the first and
third factors. She argues that threats from a drone state are more likely to be carried out
due to the possibility of sustaining a drone presence. That is, the ever-present nature of
drones can exert a sense of pressure on the target state. Also, in a situation wherein the
coercing state possesses armed drones but the targeted state does not, drones radically
shift the balance of the costs of war. Drones enable the coercer to engage in military
18

action at a low cost, yet the targeted state will suffer disproportionately high costs. As
such, drones can be used as a tool to compel submission. Zegart argues that in some
coercion situations, drones are perceived to be as coercive as ground troops, yet they do
not incur any of the danger to human lives (Zegart, 2018). Thus, as a result of their lowcost and low-risk nature, drones can represent a transformative military technology.
A drawback of this transformative technology is that by not placing American
lives in danger, drones do not draw the same public criticism as more traditional troop
deployments. Consequently, government decision-makers face a lower barrier to the use
of force, which some believe will lead to a heightened willingness to order military
strikes. Those who hold this perspective point to the frequency of US drone strikes in
countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, arguing that instances of military force
would be more infrequent if not for drones. Accordingly, some analysts worry that drones
will destabilize the global security system by freeing decision-makers from the
limitations imposed by human casualties, thus lowering the threshold for use of lethal
military force (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016).
Conversely, many scholars believe that drones merely represent the newest
development in military technology, yet they do not offer a unique advantage over
preexisting forms of military force. According to some, drones should not be considered
a transformative military technology because although drones provide militaries with
another delivery system for targeted killings, similar effects can be achieved through
other forms of military force such as ground troops or manned aircraft (Horowitz, Kreps,
and Fuhrmann, 2016). Furthermore, others base their argument upon the presumption that
a revolutionary weapon, if present on one side of a conflict, should decisively tip the odds
of winning towards the party possessing the technology (Davis et al., 2014). Given
19

that such findings have not yet been observed in reality, many are skeptical of the socalled transformative nature of drones.

Public knowledge about drones
Unlike certain issues in American foreign policy, drones often do not dominate
the nation’s headlines, and as a result, the American public tends to be ill-informed about
drones. A 2016 study by the Center for a New American Security highlighted this fact by
demonstrating how the American public possesses a low level of knowledge about
drones. First, based upon data collected from respondents, the US public struggles with
distinguishing between manned and unmanned aircraft. 54% of respondents were unable
to identify the MQ-1 Predator correctly while 66% were unable to identify the MQ-9
Reaper as an armed, unmanned aircraft. However, this inability to identify military
apparatus extended beyond just different types of drones, which can be seen in the
finding that 21% of respondents incorrectly identified the manned F-16 fighter as an
unmanned aircraft. Second, Americans demonstrate a lack of knowledge regarding the
weaponry apparatus with which drones are equipped. 32% of respondents believed that
UAVs used guns, which they do not, and 31% believed that unmanned aircraft were
capable of carrying 1000-pound bombs, yet in reality, they can only carry 500-pound
bombs at a maximum. Broadly, the American people tend to believe that UAVs are more
accurate and more likely to survive battlefield encounters than manned aircraft, both of
which are untrue. Moreover, they believe that drones are more likely to launch airstrikes
and are less constrained by rules of engagement. Despite their lack of substantive
knowledge about drone capabilities, the public favored unmanned aircraft over manned
airstrikes in all but two experimental scenarios. The two exceptions included a scenario
20

involving high risk to civilians, which prompted respondents to prefer manned over
unmanned strikes, and a scenario with low risk to air crew, in which respondents did not
display a clear preference between manned and unmanned platforms (Schneider and
Macdonald, 2016). Based on these findings, one may conclude that on the whole, the
American public is not highly knowledgeable about drones.
Despite possessing a low level of knowledge about drones, the American public’s
support still acts as the foundation for policy. In light of the high levels of approval for
lethal drone strikes among average American citizens, some scholars question whether
the assumptions embedded in polls can affect attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). In her
2014 study, Kreps argues that with regard to drones, public opinion polls often present a
viewpoint consistent with the government’s position, which glosses over controversial
features that might prompt higher levels of opposition and lower levels of support (Kreps,
2014). She suggests that this effect does not stem from wording effects, but rather,
surveys often appropriate a viewpoint that increases the likelihood that a larger
proportion of the public will approve. Her study revealed that by incorporating
questionable assumptions and omitting the most controversial aspects of drones, polls
strongly influence support for the US drone program (Kreps, 2014). First, polls often
frame drone strikes as targeting high-level terrorists, which neglects questions about
whether the targets are actually terrorists and the amount of civilian collateral damage.
Second, polls fail to include discussion of legal authorization for such strikes. Operating
under the assumption that drone strikes are legally authorized and target the correct
subjects, the public becomes more inclined to approve of US drone policy, which can be
observed in consistently high levels of support across three years of polling data (Kreps,
2014). Consequently, the approval from polls becomes incorporated into the political
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narrative surrounding drones, which further normalizes their usage. In light of these
findings, public opinion polls can compound the public’s lack of knowledge about drones
to produce a high level of approval for the US drone program.

Part II. Public Attitudes about the Use of Military Force
Despite the fact that Americans lack a substantial level of political knowledge
pertaining to a wide variety of issues and often do not appear to possess a consistent set
of political attitudes, some scholars still argue that Americans hold organized, reliable,
and important attitudes about the use of military force. The institutional structure of the
US empowers the American electorate to punish their representatives at the ballot box for
a range of issues, particularly military activities overseas. Hurwitz and Peffley argue that
the American people impose limits on policymakers in the field of foreign policy because
military issues “are inherently more threatening to the public, are more often the object of
media coverage, and are generally more salient in the people’s mind,” and as a result,
“the public is more likely to think seriously about issues like military involvement”
(Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Consequently, policymakers consider public support as a
vital factor when deciding to implement military force internationally. As this
phenomenon has continued throughout the years and across a variety of different
situations, a recurrent question has puzzled political scientists—what factors shape public
attitudes about the use of military force? The following section will address the main
hypotheses seeking to answer this question.
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Casualties
Much of the scholarly literature centers on the role of casualties in public attitudes
towards the use of military force. Conventional thinking suggests that Americans are
unsupportive of military operations that produce casualties. This phenomenon, typically
referred to as “casualty phobia,” occurs when those in the public reflexively lower their
level of support in response to the presence of casualties. The shock and horror of
casualties trigger an automatic, visceral reaction within the American public, which leads
them to call for the immediate removal of troops. In order to illustrate this point, some
scholars point to examples such as the decline in public support for American military
involvement in the Vietnam War or American withdrawal from Somalia after the “Black
Hawk Down” Army Ranger raid in October 1993 (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009). Although
casualties do possess the potential to influence the level of public support, many scholars
have argued that the American public is much more tolerant of casualties than previously
thought (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009). However, under the broad umbrella of this conclusion,
scholars differ in their explanations.
In the 1970s, John Mueller sought to understand the manner in which casualties
undermined the American public’s support for the Vietnam War, which led him to the
conclusion that public support declined according to a logarithmic model. That is, the
public was sensitive to small costs of human life in the beginning, but was only affected
by much larger losses later in the war (Mueller, 1971). Although his findings argued that
public support declined reflexively, Mueller’s work disputed the casualty phobia thesis in
part by showing that public support for a military operation didn’t dramatically drop as
the amount of casualties increased. However, over time, the scholarly consensus began to
dispute this model of inexorable decline of support and instead argued that the public
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conducts a rational cost-benefit calculus. This perspective espouses that the American
people assess all of the relevant factors at play and determine whether the benefits
outweigh the costs of the military mission in question. Operating under this assumption,
scholars diverge yet again when attempting to determine which factor is most important
in determining one’s level of public support.
Bruce Jentleson argues that the casualty tolerance of a “pretty prudent public” is
largely influenced by the “principal policy objective” of the military operation (Jentleson,
1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998). Principal policy objectives (PPOs) include foreign
policy restraint, which involves the use of military force to apply pressure on an
aggressive adversary that threatens the US and its interests, humanitarian intervention,
and internal political change within a country. Jentleson found that the American public
possesses a hierarchical structure of tolerance with regard to each of these PPOs. The
public regards foreign policy restraint as very important and deserving of a more serious
price whereas support for humanitarian intervention and internal political change hinge
upon a low threshold for cost. That is, Americans are the most tolerant of casualties when
the military operation is designed to achieve foreign policy restraint (Jentleson, 1992).
In a similar vein, Héctor Perla argues that public support for military engagements
depends on the public’s decision-making reference point, which is determined by what
the public perceives the policy’s objective to be (Perla, 2011). He suggests a Framing
Theory of Policy Objectives in which public support for military engagements will
increase when the public perceives the mission’s principal objective as seeking to
confront external threat but will decrease if the objective is viewed as seeking gains
(Perla, 2011). Consequently, framing imposed by media coverage plays a critical role in
influencing public support. For example, when the media frames the objective of
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military force as seeking to protect the public from potential threats, the American public
is more likely to back riskier, costlier, and more hawkish policies.
Similarly to Jentleson, Feaver and Gelpi assume that the American public is
relatively rational and prudent when conducting a cost-benefit calculus about a military
operation. However, Feaver and Gelpi argue that two main factors interact to influence
casualty tolerance: expectation of the probability of success of the military operation and
belief in the initial legitimacy of the decision to engage in military action (Feaver and
Gelpi, 2009). That is, “the more likely you think the operation will be a success and the
more correct you think the original decision was, the more you will be willing to pay a
higher cost in the form of mounting combat fatalities” (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009: 20).
Although both elements are required to yield a significant effect on casualty tolerance,
expectation of success is argued to be the more important of the two factors.

Elite cues
Typically forced to form their attitudes without access to all of the relevant data
about the use of military force, US citizens often turn to cues from political and military
elite. In his 1992 book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, John Zaller
hypothesized that the public tends to hold the same views as their political leaders when
the elite are united about what should be done. However, as fissures start to appear
among the elite, the public soon divides as well, aligning with the ideological or partisan
position of their preferred elite (Zaller, 1992). When Eric Larson tested this hypothesis
with regard to the American public’s attitudes about US military involvement in a wide
range of conflicts, his findings confirmed Zaller’s thesis. His 1996 study showed that
support for US military operations and the public’s willingness to tolerate casualties
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were based upon a rational cost-benefit calculation, which was heavily influenced by
consensus among political leaders (Larson, 1996). That is, when political leaders agreed
that the objectives of a military operation warranted the costs and benefits associated with
it, the public became more likely to support the operation. However, this effect did
depend on whether the public found those opinion leaders to be credible and trustworthy.
Conversely, when leaders split along partisan or ideological lines, the public tended to
divide in a similar manner. Larson’s findings also foreshadowed some of the findings of
Feaver and Gelpi wherein the higher the probability that the intervention would be
successful, the higher the probability was that the intervention would be supported
(Larson, 1996). Adam J. Berinsky’s 2007 study yielded similar findings, showing that if
elite discourse remained unified in support of military intervention, citizens were more
supportive of government policy, regardless of their political predispositions (Berinsky,
2007). His results also demonstrated that in this context, perceptions of war casualties did
not influence public attitudes toward war.
More recently, a 2018 study conducted by Golby, Feaver, and Dropp illustrated
that under certain conditions, senior military officers often have the ability to nudge
public attitudes about the use of military force. When told that senior military leaders
opposed particular military interventions, the level of public opposition to that
intervention increased. Interestingly, despite providing a small boost in public support,
endorsements of support for a military operation impacted public attitudes less strongly
than statements of disapproval. Moreover, partisanship appeared to play a critical role in
shaping the conditions under which a respondent would respond to an elite military cue
(Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, 2018). For example, Republicans were especially likely to
adhere to senior military officers on the decision surrounding the use of force,
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particularly force relating to terrorism and national defense. Although Democrats and
Independents did listen to senior military officers when they opposed an intervention, the
impact was less substantial than for Republicans.

Multilateralism
Some scholars have investigated the role of multilateralism in influencing public
support for a military operation. Steven Kull found that multilateral involvement in a
military mission boosted public support due to the belief that the US would not have to
shoulder the costs of intervention independently (Kull, Destler, and Ramsay, 1997; Kull
and Destler, 1999; Kull and Ramsay, 2000; Kull et al., 2002, 2003). That is, the public
was more resistant to the unilateral use of force, yet when intervention was framed as part
of a United Nations operation, that operation gained a majority of support (Kull, 1995).
The increased comfort of not having to “go it alone” likely set the public’s minds at ease
about the military involvement. The effect resulting from the cooperation of other
international actors could stem from a lightened economic burden as well as external
confirmation of the operation’s legitimacy.

Gender
Gender emerges as a key factor when investigating what underpins American
attitudes toward the use of military force abroad. In the US, the rate of support for
military actions is consistently higher for men than for women; however, the extent of the
gender gap can depend to a large degree on situational context. Brooks and Valentino
argued that the size of the gender gap depends on the stakes of the war, in particular
whether the objective of the war was to promote a humanitarian agenda or protect
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economic and strategic interests (Brooks and Valentino, 2011). They hypothesized that
empathy and motherhood should moderate the relationship between gender, stakes of
war, and support for going to war. Motherhood is believed to lower the likelihood of
female support for war because women are saddened to see someone else’s children
become the victims of military intervention. This heightened sense of empathy
supposedly leads to an increased distaste for war. The results confirmed this hypothesis,
showing that women were more likely to support a war when its purpose was to protect
lives rather than serve economic or strategic objectives.
Yuval Feinstein believed the gender gap to be episodic rather than consistent, yet
she attributed this gap to an interaction between gender, partisanship, and ideological
identification. However, her results demonstrated that the gender gap in support for
military engagement was not only due to partisanship; that is, a difference between men
and women does not occur simply because women are more likely to identify with the
Democratic Party and Democrats are less likely to support military action (Feinstein,
2017). By analyzing US involvement in the Gulf War, NATO’s campaign in Kosovo, and
the Iraq War, she found that the gender gap fluctuated throughout the course of the
military conflict. The divergence in support between men and women varied depending
on specific military engagements or war events, which activated ideological dispositions
differently. Using the Iraq War as an example, Feinstein’s results showed that differential
ideological dispositions, primed by the war, led Democrats to oppose US involvement in
the conflict. More specifically, an ideological disposition in question during the war on
terror was the notion that the US should adopt a foreign policy that has international
legitimacy. Throughout the course of the Iraq War, Democrats were more likely to
possess concerns about the international standing of the US, which led to lowered
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support for military action. Overall, Feinstein demonstrated that gender gaps could vary
throughout the course of military involvement as wartime events activated certain
ideological dispositions.
Others have attempted to compare gender differences by asking the American
public about their support for military action in hypothetical situations as well as
concrete, real-life scenarios. Richard C. Eichenberg’s study found that on average,
women were less supportive of the use of military force for any purpose. Interestingly,
when responding to abstract, hypothetical military operations, the gender gap was
practically nonexistent, yet upon being presented with specific questions about the use of
force in Iraq and potential civilian and military casualties, a substantial difference
between men and women began to emerge (Eichenberg, 2003). The results demonstrated
that 70% of American men and almost 60% of women supported any military action
against Iraq when the action in question was abstract. When casualties were mentioned in
surveys, men continued to respond with majority support for the use of force in four of
seven proposed episodes whereas women only showed majority support for two of seven
episodes. Much like other studies have shown, women are relatively more sensitive to
humanitarian concerns and casualties.
Furthermore, while studying the gender gap relating to public attitudes about use
of military force, some scholars have observed an interesting parallel with the gap in
support between black and white Americans. Miroslav and Donna J. Nincic hypothesized
that women and African Americans displayed lower levels of support for the use of
military force abroad due to a higher degree of political alienation. As defined by Kevin
Chen, political alienation refers to “estrangement or separation of an individual from
particular political institutions, values, structures or regimes to which he belongs or is
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related” (Chen, 1992: 42). Nincic operationalized this phenomenon by focusing on
individuals’ self-reported levels of political efficacy, which can be measured by the
amount of participation in the political process and perception of impact on political
outcomes (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). Responses from two questions by the University of
Michigan’s National Election Studies showed that black Americans experience a
consistently higher level of political alienation than whites whereas the difference in men
and women’s levels of political alienation is much smaller. Nincic’s model demonstrated
that attitudes of African Americans and women appear to be rooted in traits particular to
each group, although they did share some similar traits. That is, political alienation did
partially unite women and African Americans with regard to their approval for military
force abroad, yet it did not represent the entire basis for their preferences. Thus, social
identity does play a role in shaping individuals’ attitudes toward US military involvement
overseas, yet some aspects of this identity are rooted in structural features of US society
while others can be understood as a consequence of the group’s previous historical
experiences, such as the relation of the civil rights movement to the Vietnam War.

Partisanship
Conventional wisdom states that Republicans and Democrats are hawks and
doves, respectively, with regard to their stance on foreign policy, particularly the use of
military force. Republican hawks are often more willing to support military interventions,
oppose foreign aid and the UN, and support higher levels of military spending.
Conversely, dovish Democrats are typically less willing to support military interventions,
support foreign aid and the UN more strongly, and oppose high levels of military
spending.

Although this phenomenon continues to hold true in the present day,
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support for the use of military force has not always been aligned along the ideological
spectrum in the way it is now. In fact, up until 1965, Democrats held hawkish positions
while Republicans could be characterized as doves. Faced with the notion of such a
radical transition in political ideology, various scholars have attempted to identify what
factors prompted this change.
In the 1940s and 1950s, hawks were mostly Democrats who supported the use of
military power to defeat fascism and promote collective security; conversely,
Republicans tended to adopt dovish positions out of a desire for isolationism. Democrats
tended to support military force because such hawkish policies could produce major
benefits for their key constituencies, such as the Northeastern industries, which received a
boost in business during the early postwar era (Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom, 2016). As
for Republicans, they opposed military force due to the fiscal and regulatory
consequences associated with high levels of military spending during the 1950s
(Fordham, 2007; Hogan, 1998; Lo, 1982). High levels of military spending could impose
price controls on raw materials, which hurt key Republican constituencies. However,
beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing into the 1980s, the appeal of using military
force declined for Democrats while it rose for Republicans. For Democrats, the benefits
for Northeastern industries started to tail off, and during the 1980s, the Reagan
administration’s military buildup imposed budgetary constraints on social programs
supported by the Democratic Party (Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom, 2016; Kamlet,
Mowery, and Su, 1988). The Republicans’ support for the use of military force began to
rise as the growth of the American economy by the mid-1960s ensured that military
spending would not require the imposition of price controls on strategic raw materials
(Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom, 2016). Furthermore, the Reagan administration’s
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military buildup produced significant tax cuts, which pleased the Republicans. As a
result, beginning in the mid-1960s, Republicans and Democrats began to shift in their
foreign policy positions, ultimately adopting the previous stance of their opposing party.
After this initial shift in position, Republican and Democratic stances on foreign
policy began to drift farther apart beginning in the 1970s, which led to a steady increase
in foreign policy polarization that has continued into the present. In fact, by the 2000s,
foreign policy polarization gained the same severity as polarization regarding general
political ideology. Jeong and Quirk (2019) describe three main factors that contributed to
this rise in polarization of foreign policy. First, historical events such as the end of the
Cold War and the occurrence of the Iraq War played a role in creating and enabling the
spread of such polarization. The end of the Cold War removed a potential unifying
interest between Republicans and Democrats—the desire to block Soviet expansionism
(Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007; Prins and Marshall, 2001; Scott and Carter, 2002).
Moreover, George W. Bush’s controversial invasion of Iraq, prompting the Iraq War,
further divided the parties. Polarization surrounding issues such as these spilled over onto
smaller, less significant issues while the overall level of polarization continued to ratchet
up. Second, although partisan electoral rivalry cannot explain the entire phenomenon, it
can contribute to an explanation of the development of foreign policy polarization. Jeong
and Quirk found that the narrower the margin of seats possessed by the majority party in
the Senate, the more polarized foreign policy positions became. Third, and most
importantly, domestic political polarization appeared to spill into foreign policy, causing
foreign policy polarization to initially match, and subsequently surpass, the domestic
ideological divide (Jeong and Quirk, 2019). That is, senators tend to drift toward foreign
policy positions that are consistent with their positions on domestic issues. Thus,
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domestic conservatives are likely to become foreign policy hawks whereas domestic
liberals are likely to hold dovish views. In light of these factors contributing to its
existence, foreign policy polarization represents a key characteristic of American politics,
particularly with regard to partisans’ support for the use of military force abroad.

Part III. Primary Arguments For and Against Drones
Military effectiveness
Strong supporters of drone warfare cite military effectiveness as a principal
strength. Proponents claim that drones offer a no risk, low cost, and successful means for
fighting terrorism. First, drones are argued to be a superior form of military force by
eliminating risk to American soldiers. Second, armed UAVs are considered to be lower
cost than other air systems due to less extensive training as well as removal of the need
for search-and-rescue packages (Davis et al., 2014). Third, Byman argues that drones
have proven to be successful in achieving US policy objectives, which is exemplified by
the success of drones in damaging Al Qaeda and associated anti-American terrorist
groups. According to his research, US drones have killed an estimated 3,300 Al Qaeda,
Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen, including fifty senior
leaders, since 2008 (Byman, 2013). Drones have not only eliminated key terrorist targets,
he argues, but they have also disrupted terrorist operations by diminishing groups’ ability
to communicate and train new recruits out of a need to avoid large group meetings lest
they pose an easier target for drones. Such sentiments have been confirmed by the former
director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, who said, “[t]hose operations are seriously disrupting
al-Qaeda… It’s pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a
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very difficult time putting together any kind of command control, that they are
scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run” (Warrick and Finn, 2010).
Other researchers echo such findings, particularly with regard to the success of
lethal drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. W. Andrew Terrill, a Middle East specialist
at the Strategic Studies Institute, found that although drone strikes are highly unpopular
with the local population in Yemen, such attacks have appeared to be successful at
assisting the Yemeni government in their attempts to weaken Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) (Terrill, 2013). He points to the death of Anwar al Awlaki in
September 2011 as a notable success. Despite being a citizen of the United States, Terrill
argues that the elimination of al Awlaki was still beneficial since, according to President
Obama, he was considered a higher priority for capture or elimination than Ayman al
Zawahiri, who replaced bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda Central (Terrill, 2013).
Moreover, Terrill believes that drone strikes functioned as a vital tool in supporting
Yemen’s offensive against AQAP insurgents in May and June 2012. Following a series
of public demonstrations against President Saleh’s regime, AQAP insurgents had taken
control of significant territory in many southern Yemeni towns and cities. When
President Hadi sought to retake these areas with a dysfunctional army and air force, US
drone strikes provided intelligence to combatant forces as well as eliminated key leaders
and individuals among AQAP fighters who were preparing to ambush government forces.
Ultimately, the Yemeni government recaptured the last AQAP-controlled areas in June
2012, a fate likely made possible due to assistance provided by drone warfare. However,
in light of such success, Terrill does acknowledge that, “drones, for all their value, cannot
replace a legitimate government with a competent military in ensuring the national
security of a strategically important country such as Yemen” (Terrill, 2013: 23). Thus,
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the use of drone strikes can help to temporarily stabilize terrorist threats in foreign
countries, yet the ability to relapse into instability suggests that drone strikes cannot
permanently erase threats to US security.
Furthermore, a case study by Javier Jordan sought to investigate the effectiveness
of the drone campaign against Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, and his findings suggest that
drones successfully damage the terrorist organization’s functioning by attacking its three
key strengths. Jordan identifies Al Qaeda Central’s hierarchical structure, qualified
human resources, and material resources as critical factors that enable the group to carry
out destruction. He argues that drone strikes negatively affect the interaction between
these factors, which diminishes the capacity of the terrorist organization to carry out
highly lethal attacks. Data from the New America Foundation shows that a total of
between 340 and 357 drone attacks occurred in the tribal territories of Pakistan between
June 19, 2004 and May 31, 2013. These strikes consisted of a mix of high-value
targeting, which attacks known leaders of terrorist groups, and signature strikes, which
target unknown individuals whose pattern of behavior suggests potential terrorist activity.
By the end of May 2013, the total number of deaths caused by drone strikes was between
2,010 and 3,336. However, problematically, a study by the New America Foundation
showed that between 54 and 61 percent of fatalities during 2004-2007 were civilians.
First, Jordan argues that drone strikes impede the smooth functioning of the
organization by targeting terrorist leaders, which force them to focus more on their selfprotection rather than running the group’s operations. This fear of discovery disrupts
communication between different branches of the organization, which can be seen in the
fact that Al Qaeda Central did not publicly announce the appointment of Ayman al
Zawahiri as its leader following the death of Osama Bin Laden for a month and a half.
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Jordan comments that this delay seems odd considering that the shift to a new
commander in chief should have been a swift decision that would be quickly broadcast. A
diminished ability to communicate within the terrorist network reduces the possibility of
coordinating a complex attack. Moreover, reduced communications lessen the amount of
possible recruitment for fear that such activities could attract an attack. As such, Jordan
argues that the CIA drone campaign has forced Al Qaeda Central to switch to a more
decentralized organizational structure in which leaders have little operational capacity.
Second, Jordan claims that drone strikes have negatively impacted qualified human
resources by killing approximately 60 leaders and middle-ranking members of Al Qaeda
Central, which represents a large percentage of its elite members. Such deaths include
members in roles such as chief executive of the organization, advisory council positions,
military committee leadership, religious committee, financial committee, and propaganda
wing. Jordan argues that based on the available information, Al Qaeda Central’s level of
infrastructure is considerably less than it was before 9/11. Third, Jordan illuminates how
drone strikes have impacted key material resources of Al Qaeda Central such as money,
sanctuary, training camps, and weapons. According to Pakistani intelligence officials, the
pressure from drone strikes diminished the flow of money to Al Qaeda officials by
shutting down some transfer channels. Financial resources were also damaged due to the
death of Mustafa Abu Al Yazid in May 2012, who was identified by the 9/11
Commission Report as Al Qaeda Central’s main financial manager. Moreover, drone
strikes eliminated some of the Al Qaeda sanctuary in North Waziristan, which required
the group to move some of its members out of the region. Finally, a constant drone
presence reduced the duration of training courses, which would likely trigger a signature
strike. As a result of shortened training courses, operatives did not possess as much
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knowledge regarding how to successfully execute certain tasks, such as detonation of a
car bomb. An example of this can be seen in Faisal Shahzad’s failed attempt to detonate a
car bomb in Times Square in May 2010. Prior to this attack, he had only received a
training course lasting five days as opposed to the typical one-month of explosives
training characteristic of Al Qaeda in its Afghanistan and early Pakistan years.
Additionally, Jordan argues that drone strikes have reduced the lethality of Al
Qaeda Central attacks in the West. Between 2001 and 2006, Al Qaeda carried out three
successful terrorist operations—9/11, the Madrid train bombing, and the London
bombings—which resulted in 3,220 fatalities. However, between 2007 and 2012, 13
attempted attacks did not result in a single fatality. Despite some limitations of his
findings such as insufficient information and difficulty of isolating the effect of drone
strikes on Al Qaeda Central’s operation from other confounding variables, Jordan still
affirms that drone strikes have proved militarily effective in diminishing the threat posed
by terrorist groups (Jordan, 2014).

Military ineffectiveness
Conversely, in light of these tactical benefits, some doubt the military
effectiveness of lethal drone strikes, which leads to the belief that drones should not be
embraced as a critical strategy for American counterterrorism. In her article “Why
Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Audrey Cronin comments that drones are not
as militarily effective as they may seem. Since terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda do not
operate solely under hierarchical leadership, targeting leaders does not fundamentally
damage a terrorist organization (Cronin, 2013). Also, drones could potentially perpetuate
the existence of terrorism by alienating local populations and cultivating a desire for
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vengeance, which could lead to the creation of future terrorist recruits. Moreover, drones
eliminate the possibility of arresting and interrogating targets. By killing rather than
capturing terrorists, drones do not offer an opportunity to gain further intelligence about
the terrorist organization, which could be a more effective strategy in broader
counterterrorism efforts (Cronin, 2013).
In adherence with a similar viewpoint, Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh
conducted an empirical study to investigate the military effectiveness of lethal drone
strikes. Based on the assumption that producing effective propaganda is an important
objective of most terrorist groups, they selected Al Qaeda propaganda output as a proxy
for Al Qaeda’s capacity to organize political action. As a result, they sought to evaluate
the relationship between drone strikes and Al Qaeda propaganda output. Their results
suggest that at best, drone strikes have little or no effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to create
and distribute propaganda. In fact, their results show that drone strikes may be associated
with higher, rather than lower, levels of propaganda output. These findings could mean
that drone strikes have killed many terrorist militants associated with Al Qaeda, yet such
deaths have not truly undermined the functional capacity of the organization (Smith and
Walsh, 2013). Despite temporarily lowering the membership of the group, these drone
strikes may be counterproductive to US security by fostering greater hatred towards
America and inspiring further terrorist recruitment.

International law concerns
A key concern surrounding drone warfare stems from a fundamental tradeoff
between security and international law. Opponents argue that lethal drone strikes tend to
neglect two key components of just war theory: jus ad bellum—rules concerning the
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resort to use of force—and jus in bello—rules governing wartime conduct. When
considering jus ad bellum, many critics argue that since the United States is not at war
with countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, drone strikes are illegal
(O’Connell, 2011). Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for self-defense, which is
triggered by a threat that is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation,” but this definition appears to clash with the rather
deliberative and slow-moving nature of the target selection process for drones (Caroline
Case, 1838). As such, the right to claim anticipatory self-defense as justification for drone
strikes has not been widely accepted by the international community. Members of the
Human Rights Council of the UN also note that the self-defense argument requires higher
thresholds for necessity and proportionality, which the US has failed to demonstrate in its
drone program (Alston, 2010). By contrast, Harold Hongju Koh, the legal adviser to the
US Department of State under the Obama administration, has argued that a US drone
strike authorized in the name of self-defense cannot be considered an unlawful
assassination because “under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—
consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level
belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not
unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination’” (Alston, 2010). In light of the
controversy surrounding the Al-Awlaki case, in which an al-Qaeda-affiliated US citizen
living in Yemen was killed by a drone strike without due process of law, the Obama
administration established a set of parameters regarding permissibility of drone strikes.
These parameters included the following:
1. Suspects, such as Mr Al-Awlaki, can only be killed through drone attacks in the
event that an incarceration of such person is illusory;
2. The person in question has to be involved in preparing ‘acts of war’ against
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the U.S.;
3. Consequently, that individual should pose an immediate and significant threat to
the U.S.;
4. The State ‘hosting’ such an individual must not be able or willing to apprehend
him or her (Savage, 2011).
Many scholars worry that these rules hinge upon the definition of ambiguous concepts
such as “acts of war” and “immediate and significant threat.”
With regard to jus in bello, the Geneva Convention stipulates that parties involved
in a conflict must be able to distinguish between a civilian and a combatant as well as
take all possible precautions in both means and methods of attack to avoid or minimize
damage to civilian life. However, since many terrorists wear normal clothes and integrate
themselves within the civilian population, drone programs often struggle to differentiate
between civilians and combatants. As a result, drones carry the implicit risk of inflicting
civilian casualties. Moreover, the US often utilizes signature strikes to target terrorists,
which sometimes fall short of the standard for distinction. A signature strike uses the
patterns of behavior of a target to indicate that they intend to engage in combat against
the US or local allies; as such, signature strikes usually target training camps and
compounds suspected of containing enemy combatants (Boyle, 2013). Signature strikes
typically rely upon the assumption that the person launching the strike is certain, within
reason, that the activity witnessed is aiding the enemy (Boyle, 2013). Unfortunately,
drone strikes do not always achieve this standard because the definition of “aiding an
enemy” can vary drastically.
Drone strikes have also been argued to constitute a violation of the distinction
principle by subjecting civilians to constant anxiety and fear through a high frequency of
attacks. Coyne and Hail argue that the use of drones to combat terrorism results in a
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paradox because “drones, which are intended to kill terrorists, thereby reducing terrorism,
create terror among the populace living in the targeted area” (Coyne and Hail, 2018).
Although the creation of an atmosphere of terror can often be effective in disrupting the
operations of targeted organizations, drone-created terror does not discriminate between
civilians and enemy combatants. Instead, psychological damage is inflicted upon the
entire neighborhood, which subjects everyone to the negative externalities of such a
culture of fear, as seen in the following passage:
“Imagine that you are living somewhere in Pakistan, Yemen, or Gaza where
the United States and its allies suspect a terrorist presence. Day and night,
you hear a constant buzzing in the sky. Like a lawnmower. You know that
this flying robot is watching everything you do. You can always hear it.
Sometimes, it fires missiles into your village. You are told the robot is
targeting extremists, but its missiles have killed family, friends, and
neighbors. So, your behavior changes: you stop going out, you stop
congregating in public, and you likely start hating the country that controls
the flying robot. And you probably start to sympathize a bit more with the
people these robots, called drones, are monitoring” (Owen, 2013).
As noted in the passage above, terrorist organizations can harness this drone-created
terror as a recruitment tool, which could undermine the very purpose of drone strikes in
the first place. Thus, although drone strikes are effective in eliminating targets, many
worry that their unintended consequences might offset the benefits.
In lights of these concerns about violation of international law and the potential
consequences of drone strikes, I advance the following hypothesis:
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H1: International law concerns will yield the greatest negative impact on public
approval of lethal drone strikes used to target terrorists in foreign countries.
In their 2016 study, Kreps and Wallace found that highlighting inconsistencies between
American usage of lethal drone strikes and principles of international law significantly
altered public attitudes toward drone warfare (Kreps and Wallace, 2016). Their findings
suggested that questions about legality influenced public attitudes more strongly than
military effectiveness, and I expect similar results from this survey experiment. I expect
most respondents to not have previously considered international legal concerns when
formulating their opinions about drones, focusing instead on the removal of American
casualties. However, when presented with such information about legal dilemmas
surrounding drone warfare, I predict that respondents will display a lower level of
approval.
Moreover, in addition to concerns about violation of international law, many
criticize drone strikes for lacking an appropriate foundation in domestic legal authority.
The primary basis for legal authorization of drone strikes is the Authorization to Use
Military Force (AUMF) passed on September 14, 2001. The AUMF enables the president
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons” (Congress, 2001). The Bush and Obama administrations both
relied upon an extensive interpretation of this law to pursue terrorists abroad, which
includes the use of drone strikes. The Obama administration often cited the AUMF as
justification for expanding the use of drone strikes in countries such as Pakistan,
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Yemen, and Somalia by arguing that its “authority has no specified temporal or
geographic limit” (Boyle, 2013). However, many scholars are concerned that the AUMF
provides the US with a blank check to use military force anywhere in the world until
terrorist organizations are completely eradicated.

Increased ease of military intervention
Although the elimination of American military casualties represents a key benefit
of drones, many scholars worry that this capability will excessively lower the threshold
for authorizing lethal military operations, thus facilitating a great number of strikes.
Singer argues that “when politicians can avoid the political consequences of the
condolence letter—and the impact that military casualties have on voters and on the news
media—they no longer treat previously weighty matters of war and peace the same way”
(Singer, 2012). That is, by removing military casualties from the decision-making
calculus, drones reduce the need for extensive political debate, which could lead to a
greater willingness and ease of deploying lethal military force. Such an increase in the
ease of military intervention could destabilize the global security environment by creating
the potential for more conflicts to emerge.
Moreover, since the use of drones is not treated as a part of “war” in a formal
sense, drone strike operations are typically not discussed in Congress. Instead, the CIA
usually executes them clandestinely. According to Knoops, CIA methodology
surrounding drone attacks remains obscure; such a lack of clarity can potentially give the
CIA free reign to order killings as it sees fit (Knoops, 2012). Thus, some worry that drone
warfare fundamentally challenges the decision-making process of a republican
government, which, according to Kant, is less likely to go to war since a republican
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government must remain accountable to its citizens. Kant asserts that justification for war
stems from public deliberation and representative action, so after discussing the
potentially disastrous consequences of war, communities will generally agree upon
actions that generally promote peace (Kaag and Kreps, 2013). When drones are
introduced in the equation, however, the consequences of war experienced most directly
by American citizens vanish. Consequently, citizens will place less pressure on their
representatives to prevent war, which means that the frequency of war could increase.
Furthermore, in addition to diminished political and tactical thresholds for
military interventions, potential ethical concerns arise from a lowered moral threshold to
kill human beings. Some argue that as a result of the greater distance between operator
and target, the use of drones can reduce the amount of contemplation regarding the
decision to kill a target. It is argued that drone pilots may not fully comprehend the
implications of their attacks because carrying out an attack from behind a control screen
may produce a less visceral reaction than a more direct interaction such as battlefield
engagement or a manned airstrike (Knoops, 2012). The ease of remotely pushing a button
capable of killing someone could create the potential for a so-called “video game”
mentality in which human targets are reduced to mere blips on a screen.
Based on such concerns about the consequences of an increased ease of military
intervention resulting from lethal drone usage, I predict the following:
H2: Increased ease of military intervention will yield a weaker negative impact on
public approval of lethal drone strikes than international law concerns.
I expect that increased ease of military intervention will result in a less significant impact
on public approval of lethal drone warfare because I predict that respondents will struggle
more with conceptualization of this potential consequence. The implications of a
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lower threshold regarding the use of force may be a less tangible concept to comprehend
in comparison with questions of international law, which leads to the expectation that
increased ease of military intervention will yield a less significant impact on approval.

Experimental Design
In light of the existing concerns documented in the literature, I focused on four
main factors—military effectiveness, military ineffectiveness, international law, and
increased ease of military intervention—to determine which has the greatest impact on
American public approval of lethal drone strikes. To test this, I conducted a survey with
embedded experimental manipulations on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online
service through which MTurk “Workers” are compensated for completion of surveys.
MTurk offers researchers and companies a means to recruit individuals to accomplish
tasks typically requiring human intelligence, such as the classification of pictures,
transcription of handwriting or completion of surveys with embedded experimental
manipulations (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). To get started, a researcher, the
“Requester” as labeled on MTurk, creates an account, allocates funds to his or her
account, and posts “job listings” describing the requirements of the Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) and amount paid for completion. Workers’ payment can range from as low as
$0.15 to as high as $0.75 per HIT. In order to ensure a higher quality sample, the
Requester can restrict how many times a Worker may complete the task and set
requirements for respondents including their country of residence, age, and prior approval
ratings. A limitation of this project is that although Amazon Mechanical Turk offers a
more representative sample than the undergraduate student body at the University of
Pennsylvania, mTurk respondents are not representative of the entire American public.
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That being said, many scholars continue to utilize this service because mTurk
samples tend to fare better than other common convenience samples (Kreps and Wallace,
2016). Also, past research studies have shown that studies using mTurk produce
comparable treatment effects to studies utilizing more representative samples (Berinsky,
Huber, and Lenz, 2012). Researchers often use two primary measures in order to assess
the validity of the research conducted using MTurk—external and internal validity of the
findings. In order to assess the external validity of MTurk findings, that is, whether the
causal estimates from the research can be generalized to other settings and samples,
Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz compared the characteristics of MTurk samples to those of
other samples commonly used in political science research such as convenience samples,
samples generated by high-quality Internet panels, and probability samples of US
residents (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). To further address concerns about
generalizability, they also used MTurk to replicate prior experiments. Their findings
suggest that MTurk samples fare well in comparison to the characteristics of other
research samples. For example, on many demographics such as gender and education, an
MTurk sample was very similar to the unweighted data from American National Election
2008-2009 Panel Study (ANESP); however, the MTurk sample underrepresented blacks
and Hispanics as well as overrepresented younger and ideologically liberal citizens
(Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). These results suggest that although the MTurk
sample does not represent the US population, it certainly does not present a drastically
distorted view of the American demographic makeup. Furthermore, the replication of
three different experiments using an MTurk sample yielded highly similar results to those
found in the published research, which suggests that MTurk can produce generalizable
findings.
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In order to assess the internal validity of MTurk findings, which determines
whether the experiment’s causal estimates appropriately reflect the effects of the
experimental manipulation, Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz investigated concerns about
multiple completions of the survey and subject inattentiveness. They found that for a
given survey, only 2.4% of the total responses came from the same IP address, yet this
does not provide convincing evidence of a pattern of repeat survey takers. Even if these
findings did reflect repeat survey takers rather than multiple people taking the survey
from the same public location, the percentage is so low that only a small amount of
responses would be contaminated (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). With regard to
concerns about subject inattentiveness, Berinsky et al. found that when asked to recall a
detail from a story previously read in the survey, 60% of MTurk respondents answered
the question correctly. MTurk workers thus dramatically outperformed samples from
Polimetrix/YouGov and Survey Sampling International, of which only 49% and 46%,
respectively, correctly responded to an identical question. These findings suggest that
subject inattentiveness should not represent a major concern about MTurk samples.
Rather, due to their payment incentive, MTurk Workers might even be overly attentive,
which could be problematic if a heightened level of attention to experimental stimuli
enables respondents to determine the experimenter’s intent and behave accordingly
(Orne, 1962; Sears, 1986). Overall, with the caveat that MTurk Workers tend to be
younger and more ideologically liberal than the general American public, which could
limit their suitability for some research topics, MTurk samples fare no worse than
commonly used convenience samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012).
I received funding from CURF, which was used to compensate respondents $0.50
for their answers. The survey instrument consisted of presenting the participant with a
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passage describing a hypothetical scenario about US usage of lethal drone strikes in a
potentially threatening military conflict. The beginning of the passage in each treatment
presented the same information about the scenario. Namely, the United States had
discovered a group of extremists operating in Pakistan. This group of extremists was
thought to possess plans to attack the United States. In response, the United States was
planning to launch lethal drone strikes, and the passage described the basic functioning of
a drone, including how drone strikes eliminate the possibility of American military
casualties. The passages diverged across conditions by ultimately incorporating
statements that related to one of the four factors relevant to the broader discussion of
drones. The experimental conditions are as follows:

Militarily Effective:
•

Highlights the main strategic appeal of lethal drone strikes in that they
possess the capability to kill suspected terrorists, which can make
Americans safer.

•

Invokes the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is
the highest-ranking and most senior officer in the US Armed Forces.

•

Treatment: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that
the strikes have been instrumental in killing suspected militants and
making Americans safer.”

Militarily Ineffective:
•

Highlights the notion that lethal drone strikes may undermine their
intended purpose of making Americans safer by generating anti-American
sentiment.
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•

Invokes the authority of prominent non-governmental and
intergovernmental organizations dedicated to the protection of
international law and human rights.

•

Treatment: “Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have
indicated that the strikes trigger anti-US sentiment and help militants
recruit new members, making Americans less safe.”

International Law:
•

Highlights the concern that lethal drone strikes violate fundamental
principles of international law.

•

Invokes the authority of prominent non-governmental and
intergovernmental organizations dedicated to the protection of
international law and human rights.

•

Treatment: “Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have
indicated that the strikes violate international law in two ways. First, these
organizations have indicated that these strikes violate international law
because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country
where the attack takes place. Second, these organizations have indicated
that these strikes also violate international law because they do not take
necessary measures to prevent the death of civilians.”

Increased Ease of Military Intervention:
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•

Highlights the concern that lethal drone strikes lower the threshold for
conducting military operations overseas, which could lead to an increase
in the frequency of military interventions and a decrease in the ethical
obstacles to killing a human being.

•

Does not invoke a relevant authority figure or organization.

•

Treatment: “Scholars have indicated that the ability to conduct strikes
without risk to American lives will lower the threshold for authorizing
lethal military operations, which could increase the level of American
military intervention worldwide. Also, since drone strikes can be executed
with the push of a button, some scholars have indicated that drone strikes
could make it too easy to kill human beings.”

After being presented with the stimulus, respondents were asked to rank their
level of approval of the US conducting missile strikes from drones in that particular
scenario on a scale of 1 to 5 wherein 1 indicated strong approval and 5 indicated strong
disapproval. After numerically ranking their level of approval, respondents were asked to
explain why they gave their response, which took the form of an open-ended question.
Next, they were asked, “Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you
approved initially or not. If given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or
manned airstrikes to target extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?”
Furthermore, respondents were asked to rank their approval of US drone strikes to target
extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia more generally, which was
also ranked on a 1 to 5 scale. Finally, the survey collected relevant information about the
respondents’ partisanship, race, age, gender, prior military service, close relationship to
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someone who has served in the armed forces, level of education, knowledge about
drones, and familiarity with robots. Since self-reported measures of knowledge can be
inaccurate, respondents’ actual level of knowledge about drones was checked with a
question requiring them to identify unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes from a
list. The entire survey instrument can be found in the appendix.

Experimental Results
The sample is composed of 842 respondents. As expected, this sample is not
entirely representative of the American public; however, in some demographics, it does
not differ drastically. First, compared to the results from the US Census in July 2018
showing that women make up 50.8% of the American population, the mTurk sample in
this study overrepresents men and underrepresents women, who make up 62.47% and
37.53% of the sample, respectively. In terms of race, the sample is 79.45% white, 9.14%
African-American, 1.19% American Indian, and 7.48% Asian-American. Compared to
the US public at large, whites are overrepresented, yet the percentages of AfricanAmericans, American Indians, and Asian-Americans are roughly equivalent. Moreover,
those who identify as having Hispanic or Latino origin make up 13.66% of the sample,
which closely resembles the 12.5% found in the American public at large. With regard to
partisan identification, 45.12% of the sample report being Democratic, 29.64% as
Republican, and 25.24% as Independent. Thus, the sample over represents Democrats,
which a Gallup poll in February 2019 found to make up 30% of the American people
(Gallup, 2019). Most surprisingly, the sample drastically overrepresents the percentage of
those who have served in the US armed forces. According to a 2015 study by
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FiveThirtyEight, 7.3% of all living Americans have served in the armed forces at some
point in their lives (Chalabi, 2015). Interestingly, 18.41% of this sample reported having
served in the US armed forces. In light of the composition of this sample, let us now turn
to the findings.
Despite self-reporting relatively high levels of familiarity with drones, the
findings seem to confirm the general consensus in the literature that Americans possess a
low level of knowledge about drones. When asked to self-report how much they’ve read
or heard about drone usage by the US military, about a quarter of respondents report
having heard either a “great deal” or “a lot” (28.21%). Furthermore, 39.17% of
respondents report having exposure to a “moderate amount” of information about use of
drones by the US military. When combined, the findings show that about two-thirds of
respondents have read or heard at least a moderate amount about the US military’s use of
drones (67.38%). Conversely, only 3.93% of respondents state that they have no
familiarity with use of manned surveillance aircraft. Thus, these findings seem to suggest
that US military drone usage represents a topic of interest with which many Americans
are at least somewhat familiar. However, does this relatively high level of self-reported
familiarity translate to actual knowledge about drones? Sadly, the answer is no. In order
to measure respondents’ level of knowledge about drones, they were asked to identify the
unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes from a list of US military aircraft, which
included unmanned aircraft capable of lethal operations (e.g. MQ-1 Predator), unmanned
aircraft only used for surveillance (e.g RQ-4 Global Hawk), and manned aircraft (e.g. F16). By selecting MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and RQ-7 Shadow, the respondent is
recorded as completely and correctly answering the question. Only 1.78% of respondents
correctly identify all three forms of unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes
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without the selection of any incorrect answers. Given that this metric for measuring level
of knowledge about drones is rather high for an average citizen, we also examine how
many respondents correctly identify two of the three correct answers without the
inclusion of any incorrect responses, which makes up 7.60% of the sample. Lowering the
bar for knowledge even further, we also look at the amount of respondents who correctly
identify at least two of the three correct answers but also mark an incorrect answer. These
correct-incorrect mixed responders represent 6.41% of the sample. Interestingly, the most
common erroneous responses that occur in conjunction with correct answers are the RQ-4
Global Hawk, an unmanned aircraft used for surveillance, and the EA-18G Growler, a
manned aircraft capable of lethal strikes. Also, 9.38% of respondents fail to select a
single correct option. Finally, and perhaps most notably, 54.75% of respondents respond,
“don’t know” and do not select any of the aircraft options. This appears to contrast with
the findings above showing that the majority of respondents possess at least a moderate
amount of familiarity with the US military’s usage of drones. As such, this seems to
indicate that self-reported levels of knowledge can be overly optimistic. Thus, these
results echo previous findings in the literature suggesting the American public knows
very little about unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes, or as they’re commonly
referred to, lethal drone strikes.
Next, we turn to how respondents’ levels of approval varied across experimental
conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the aggregated levels of approval and disapproval across
experimental conditions. As expected, the majority of respondents approve of the usage
of drone strikes, regardless of the particular treatment to which they were assigned.
Surprisingly, the greatest percentage of approval can be found in the Militarily
Ineffective condition.
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Figure 1. Aggregated levels of approval across experimental condition.

Also, quite interestingly, the second largest percentage of approval can be found
in the Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition. The International Law condition
contains the lowest percentage of approval and highest percentage of disapproval, which
mirrors the findings of preexisting literature claiming that international law concerns can
be impactful on respondents’ level of approval (Kreps and Wallace, 2016). However, the
highest percentage of “neither approve nor disapprove” can be found in the International
Law condition, which could suggest that some respondents do not fully comprehend the
international law concerns with which they’re presented. If confused by concepts such as
the violation of a country’s sovereignty, these respondents might feel as though they do
not know enough to render a judgment on drone strikes in one direction or the other.
Thus, these respondents might opt for a statement of neutrality. Conversely, respondents
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in this condition could choose “neither approve nor disapprove” to reflect their conflicted
feelings about approval. Although they admire the benefits of drone strikes, their support
could waver after being presented with statements about violation of international law.
Finally, the second highest percentage of aggregate disapproval can be found in the
Militarily Effective condition, which is somewhat surprising. Despite being presented
with the positive treatment about drones, that is, the condition emphasizing how drones
make Americans safer, 27% of respondents in that treatment still disapprove.
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of respondents that fell into each approval
category for all 4 treatments. Across all conditions, the largest percentage of respondents
can be categorized as “somewhat approve” (35.1% in total). Those who “somewhat
approve” outnumber those who “strongly approve” (25.7% of all respondents), which
seems to indicate that respondents could be reluctant about wholeheartedly approving of
drone strikes, yet still find them to be a valuable military weapon. Interestingly, the
highest percentage of respondents who “strongly approve” can be found in the Increased
Ease of Military Intervention condition (29.1%), followed by 28.8% in the Militarily
Effective condition. The relatively high percentage of “strongly approve” respondents in
the Militarily Effective condition is not surprising given the fact that those respondents
were presented with the claim that drone strikes make Americans safer, which would
seem to naturally increase the intensity of approval. However, the fact that the largest
percentage of “strongly approve” can be found in the Increased Ease of Military
Intervention condition could possibly indicate respondents’ perception of increased
frequency of military intervention as a positive factor. Respondents might wish the US
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to possess the flexibility and resources to intervene militarily as it sees fit. In light of
this, respondents’ stronger level of approval for such technology would make sense.
The greatest percentage of "strongly disapprove" respondents can be found in the
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Figure 2. Percentage of respondents in each approval level across experimental conditions.

is the condition claiming that drones make Americans safer. However, this could perhaps
be attributed to the fact that this condition explicitly states that drones kill suspected
militants. Such straightforward language could deter respondents from approval. The
second largest percentage of "strongly disapprove" can be found in the International Law
condition, which does make sense. The magnitude of this percentage (11.9%) still seems
somewhat low in light of the expectations in the majority of drone literature, which
claims that international law violations are a major concern about drones. However, the
fact that international law violations might be more salient to scholars than average
citizens can be reflected in the 18.1% of respondents who neither “approve nor dis56
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Table 2. Levels of approval across experimental conditions. Results presented graphically in Figure 2.

Table 1. Levels of approval across experimental conditions, aggregated. Results presented graphically in Figure 1.

-approve” in the International Law condition.
After the treatment, when told that a strike was going to occur regardless of their
initial level of approval and asked whether they would prefer unmanned airstrikes or
manned airstrikes, the vast majority of respondents across conditions still opt for
unmanned airstrikes. For those in the Militarily Effective condition, 72.38% of
respondents prefer unmanned airstrikes, which represents the highest percentage of those
favoring drones across conditions. The lowest percentage of respondents demonstrating
this preference can be found in the Increased Ease of Military Intervention; however,
even still, 66.20% of those in this treatment choose unmanned over manned airstrikes.
Thus, these findings show that even if respondents do not necessarily approve of them,
they still tend to prefer drone strikes to manned airstrikes, likely due to the elimination of
the possibility of military casualties.
After looking at the breakdown of approval levels across experimental conditions,
we turn now to determining which demographic factors and treatment condition influence
the likelihood of overall approval of drone strikes most strongly. Since the levels of
approval ranged from 1 (strongly approve) to 5 (strongly disapprove), a negative
coefficient indicates a greater likelihood of approval. Conversely, a positive coefficient
points to a lower likelihood of approval and a higher likelihood of disapproval. The
results show that the most significant predictors of overall approval of drone strikes are
service in the armed forces, identification as a Republican, Hispanic or Latino origin, and
having a significant relationship with someone who served in the armed forces. As
indicated by Table 3, Republican partisanship is an extremely significant indicator of
approval of drone strikes, which seems to be consistent with the preexisting literature
(-1.010, p <0.01). Conversely, a bivariate regression between overall approval of
58

drone strikes and Democratic self-identification shows that Democratic respondents are
more likely to disapprove of drone strikes. From these findings, Republicans do tend to
be more hawkish than Democrats as suggested by previous studies.
Table 4 illustrates how service in the
armed forces represents another significant
indicator of approval. Those who previously
served in the armed forces are statistically
more likely to approve of lethal drone
strikes to target extremists in foreign
countries

(-0.750, p<0.01). This finding

makes sense given that those who were
members of the US military likely risked
their lives during their service. It seems

Table 3. Analysis of partisanship and drone strike
approval. Standard error in parentheses.

natural that such respondents would opt for a form of military intervention that removes
the

possibility

military

of

American

casualties.

Similarly,

those who have a significant
person in their lives who has
served in the armed forces are
also more likely to approve of
drone

strikes;

however,

this

relationship is not as significant
Table 4. Analysis of service in armed forces and drone strike
approval. Standard error in parentheses.

of an indicator as those who

served in the armed forces themselves (-0.302, p<0.01; see Table 5).
59

Furthermore, those who are of Hispanic or Latino origin are significantly more
likely to approve of drone strikes, a finding which has not been commonly studied in the
drone literature (-0.438, p<0.01; see Table 6). With regard to gender, females are
statistically less likely to approve of the usage of drone strikes (0.168, p<0.1; see Table
7). This finding mirrors the results from previous studies wherein women tend to be more
disapproving of the use of military force in general. Finally, neither age nor level of
education appears to be significant indicators of approval of drone strikes. Although
those who are 40-59 years old tend to be more likely to approve of drones and those who
are 20-39 tend to be less likely to approve, these findings are not statistically significant
(Table 8). Similarly, respondents who hold either a bachelor’s degree or graduate degree
are more likely to approve of drone strikes, yet these relationships fail to achieve
statistical significance (Table 9). Overall, these findings illustrate that those who are
Republican, Hispanic/Latino, served in the armed forces, or know someone who has

Table 5. Analysis of significant person in life who served in the armed forces and drone strike approval.
Standard error in parentheses.
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served in the military are more likely to approve of drone strikes.

Table 6. Analysis of Hispanic or Latino origin and
drone strike approval. Standard error in parentheses.

Table 7. Analysis of female and drone strike approval. Standard
error in parentheses.

Table 9. Level of education and drone strike approval.
Standard error in parentheses.
Table 8. Analysis of age and drone strike approval.
Standard error in parentheses.
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In order to determine which experimental condition yields the greatest impact on
the likelihood of drone strike approval, Table 10 displays the results of a multivariate
regression

of

the

treatment conditions and
the

most

demographic

influential
factors.

The Militarily Effective
treatment was utilized as
the baseline condition to
which other conditions
could be compared. A
graphical representation
of these findings can be
found in Figure 3, which
plots

the

average

marginal effect across

Table 10. Analysis of treatment conditions, most significant
demographic factors, and drone strike approval. Standard error in
parentheses.

the conditions. First and foremost, the International Law condition produces the most
substantial impact on approval of drone strikes compared to the other experimental
conditions (0.162). This result thus confirms H1, which predicted that the International
Law condition would yield the most negative impact on approval of drone strikes.
Although this coefficient does not reach a level of statistical significance, this finding
mirrors the results of previous studies. Furthermore, this demonstrates that the public
does possess concerns about the international law violations inherent in drone strikes,
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which lower their likelihood of approval. Neither the Militarily Ineffective condition nor
the Increased Ease of Military Intervention produce substantial or significant impacts on
the overall level of approval of drone strikes. Interestingly, and quite surprising, both the
Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of Military Intervention conditions slightly
increase the likelihood that a respondent will approve of drone strikes. Although this
study does not possess any tangible evidence explaining why this result occurred,
possible expanations for these findings will be discussed in greater depth later.

Figure 3. Average marginal effect of experimental conditions on approval.

H2 is partially confirmed by the findings since the Increased Ease of Military
Intervention condition yields a weaker negative impact on public approval of lethal drone
strikes than the International Law condition. However, as discussed above, quite
unexpectedly, the Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition slightly increases the
likelihood of approval, albeit not in a statistically significant fashion. This finding could
be explained by a perception among respondents that the ability to intervene militarily in
a foreign country with greater ease in fact represents a strength, rather than a liability, of
drone strikes. Such repondents might believe that in order for the US to keep its citizens
safe and maintain its military supremacy within the global order, it must possess the
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capacity to intervene as it sees fit. Upon hearing that drones would enable such
capability, respondents could be more willing to approve. Table 10 also displays similar
findings with regard to which demographic factors are most influential in determining
likelihood of approval of drone strikes. Republican identity and service in the armed
forces both yield statistically significant impacts on approval wherein Republicans and
veterans are significantly more likely to approve of drone strikes (-0.927, p<0.01; -0.433,
p<0.01, respectively). Also, women are significantly less likely to approve of drone
strikes in comparison to men (0.201, p< 0.05). Holding a graduate or professional degree,
however, yields only a slight impact on the likelihood of approval.
Figure 3 illustrates the average marginal effects of the experimental treatments
and most significant demographic indicators. As a frame of reference, the points above
the 0.0 line indicate a decline in approval whereas points below the 0.0 line indicate an
increase in approval. The farther from the 0.0 line a point is, the more significant the
relationship between the relevant factor and approval of lethal drone strikes. Also, these
findings present relatively high margins of error, which could be due to a lack of
representativeness in the sample. Quite clearly, one can see that being a Republican or
veteran significantly increases the likelihood of approving of US usage of lethal drone
strikes to target terrorists in foreign countries. These two factors also possess relatively
lower marginal errors; that is, the effects vary less substantially than for other variables
tested. Holding a graduate degree also appears to result in a higher likelihood of
approval; however, this finding is not as statistically significant as other demographic
factors tested and the range for error is considerably larger (0.119). Conversely,
identification as a female decreases the likelihood of approval; thus, women are more
likely to disapprove of US usage of lethal drone strikes. As seen with the other
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statistically significant findings in this figure, the effect of being female on approval
possesses a considerably smaller margin of error (0.086). Finally, when assessing the
relative impacts of the experimental conditions, Figure 3 shows that only the
International Law condition appears to produce a noticeable difference in approval. By
comparison, both the Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of Military Intervention
conditions fall below the 0.0 line, yet their seemingly insignificant distance from the
baseline indicates that they increase respondents’ likelihood of approval only very
slightly. Thus, these findings confirm H1, which predicted that the International Law
condition would yield the greatest negative impact on public approval of the use of lethal
drone strikes to target terrorists in foreign countries.

Conclusion
In a political environment typically characterized by fissures in public opinion on
policy, the fact that a majority of Americans support a rather controversial form of
military technology appears quite surprising. Thus, this thesis sought to identify the
relevant factors that influence public attitudes about lethal drone strikes used to target
extremists in foreign countries and determine which factor produces the greatest impact
on approval. In order to do this, I conducted a survey experiment on Amazon Mechanical
Turk in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
treatments—Militarily Effective, Militarily Ineffective, International Law, and Increased
Ease of Military Intervention. All conditions presented respondents with a hypothetical
scenario in which the US planned to execute a lethal strike using a UAV (unmanned
aerial vehicle) to eliminate a group of extremists with suspected plans to attack the US.
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Each condition differed with the inclusion of a relevant argument from the scholarly
literature highlighting either a benefit or negative consequence of lethal drone strikes.
First, my analysis showed that international law concerns exert the most
noticeable effect on the American public’s level of approval for drone strikes, which is
consistent with previous literature (Kreps and Wallace, 2016). That is, when presented
with the claim that lethal drone strikes violate international law by disrupting the
sovereignty of the targeted state and failing to appropriately prevent the occurrence of
civilian casualties, respondents become less likely to approve. The results showed that the
Militarily Ineffective condition produced a slight increase in the likelihood of approval,
which seems puzzling considering that this treatment exposed respondents to a
fundamental concern about lethal drone strikes. Although the study does not provide any
explicit answers to make sense of these findings, a few potential explanations can be
offered. An increased likelihood of approval in the Militarily Ineffective condition, which
claimed that drone strikes might actually make Americans less safe, could reflect
respondents’ distrust of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. This
condition invoked the authority of organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the
United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism. In their
written responses explaining their level of approval, a few respondents in this condition
reported that they “don’t believe a single thing the UN says.” This indicates that when
presented with a claim relying on the expertise of that organization, respondents could be
inclined to automatically disregard that information. This explanation fits with the
findings from Kreps and Wallace’s 2016 study, which showed that across three issue
frames, at least 70% of respondents found the government (Joint Chiefs of Staff) credible
whereas the UN’s credibility was relatively lower across the civilian and effectiveness
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frames. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch was generally viewed as the least credible
source with ratings around or below 50%. These results reflect some Americans’
skepticism about the motives and expertise of outside organizations, especially NGOs. As
a result, distrust in intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations could have
factored into Americans’ slight increase in approval of lethal drone strikes.
Second, the results of this study showed that partisanship, prior service in the
armed forces, and gender are the most significant predictors of approval of lethal drone
strikes. Republicans and veterans are significantly more likely to approve of drone
strikes, which mirrors findings from previous studies investigating the determinants of
public attitudes regarding the use of military force. Conversely, consistent with previous
work regarding the relationship between gender and use of military force, women are
much less likely than men to approve of lethal drone strikes. Although drone strikes
operate in a fundamentally different way than other forms of military force, these results
indicate that drones share similar demographic predictors with conventional military
technology such as manned airstrikes or ground troops.
Third, despite the negative impact of international law concerns on approval, the
vast majority of respondents across all conditions still favored unmanned over manned
airstrikes, which illustrates the extent to which the American public values US safety
above all else. Even in the International Law condition, two-thirds (66.67%)

of

respondents preferred unmanned to manned airstrikes. Respondents’ written responses
clearly displayed an awareness of the cost-benefit calculus involved in the use of lethal
drone strikes, yet the majority still stated that whatever consequences may arise represent
only a small price to pay for America’s safety. Main concerns included the possibility of
civilian casualties and the uncertainty of the information about the targets. Many
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respondents were reluctant about drone strikes given the fact that the targets were only
“suspected” extremists, and they often expressed a desire for more evidence of the
targets’ violent intentions against the US. That being said, respondents overcame these
doubts by sating that everything possible must be done to combat terrorism. Thus, these
findings also indicate how the threat of terrorism continues to loom large in respondents’
minds. Overall, this study showed that US safety and protection of American lives trump
all other concerns, leading to majority approval of actions required to achieve those
goals.
This study leads to important conclusions in both scholarship and public policy.
With regard to academic literature, this thesis confirms previous accounts of the
determinants of public support for military force as well as situates those findings in the
context of lethal drone strikes. Following in the footsteps of Kreps and Wallace’s 2016
study, these results challenge previous arguments asserting that military effectiveness is
more influential than international law concerns on public support for use of force (Gelpi,
Feaver, and Reifler, 2009; Press, Sagan, and Valentino, 2013). Instead, my findings
contribute to the growing body of literature demonstrating how international law
concerns effectively frame public perceptions of US military actions. The results of this
study also confirm Perla’s findings that public support for military engagements will
increase when the public perceives the mission’s principal objective as seeking to
confront an external threat (Perla, 2011). In this case, Americans perceived drones as
addressing an external terrorist threat identified in a small village in Pakistan. Post 9/11,
terrorism remains a salient concern for many Americans, especially given the recurrence
of terrorist attacks worldwide in recent years. Furthermore, this study confirms the notion
that the public is capable of engaging in a rational cost-benefit calculus with regard to
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the use of military force (Larson, 1996). In their written explanations, respondents
acknowledged a notable cost of drone strikes—civilian casualties—by expressing a desire
to use drones in a way that minimizes the likelihood of this consequence. However, in
light of the risks, the majority of respondents commented that protecting American lives,
both in combat and back at home, was more important. This style of response indicates
the presence of a cost-benefit calculus, confirming Larson’s thesis. Finally, my findings
provide further evidence that Republicans tend to be more hawkish than Democrats
regarding military intervention, and women often oppose the use of military force more
strongly than men (Feinstein, 2017; Brooks and Valentino, 2011). However, the results of
this study challenge Eichenberg’s findings that a gender gap is almost nonexistent in the
presence of abstract, hypothetical scenarios (Eichenberg, 2003). This study’s
experimental stimulus included a hypothetial opportunity for use of lethal drone strikes,
yet the results clearly showed that women were less likely to approve than men.
With regard to public policy, my findings suggest that even in the face of
criticisms from international organizations such as the United Nations, public support for
lethal drone strikes remains rather durable. As discussed above, although violations of
international law yielded the greatest negative impact on public approval, the majority of
respondents still favored unmanned to manned airstrikes. Such a high level of public
support for drones will likely encourage the continued usage of this technology. That
being said, for those who wish to reduce the prevalence of US drone strikes, an appeal to
international legal violations might offer the best avenue for diminishing public support.
Due to the nature of the American democratic system, public support provides a critical
foundation for the continuation of policy. Thus, arguments presented by international
organizations could activate enough concern in the American public to the point where
69

they begin to rescind their approval and demand policy change. Even if the process does
not occur quite this radically, such campaigns could still lead to public outcry for more
regulation and oversight of US drone strike operations. As a result, the United States
might have to be more selective in its choice of drone strikes.
In terms of future military technology policy, despite high levels of public
approval for lethal drone strikes, the results of this study suggest that the American public
remains apprehensive about technological malfunction, which could preclude the future
development of increasingly autonomous weapons systems. In their written responses,
many participants expressed concerns about the reliability of drones, worrying that
machines can malfunction, rely on inaccurate information, and be hacked. Some
respondents even remarked that they would not support the use of drones if they were not
controlled by human operators. These findings suggest that the American public’s distrust
of technology will likely preclude their approval of increasingly autonomous weaponry
systems (so-called “killer robots”) wherein humans are either on the loop (monitoring or
turning off the system as necessary) or completely out of the loop (allowing an
autonomous system to make its own choices for the completion of its mission). Thus,
although US safety and prevention of casualties are critical to many Americans, it
remains highly unlikely that they will be willing to support autonomous weaponry
anytime soon.
Finally, this thesis provides a starting point for future avenues of research. First,
future researchers could investigate how the Trump administration has affected the
impact of international legal concerns on public attitudes regarding warfare. As
evidenced by the withdrawal of the US from the United Nations Human Rights Counsel
on June 19, 2018, the Trump administration has challenged the legitimacy of the
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United Nations and espoused a return to patriotism rather than use of multilateralism.
Currently, the United Nations represents one of the preeminent centers for the creation
and preservation of international law norms. However, if the American people begin to
internalize such patriotic, “America First” rhetoric, their perceptions of the legitimacy,
credibility, and usefulness of the United Nations could decline. Future work could thus
investigate whether this decline results in a decreased impact of international law
concerns on public attitudes regarding the use of military force, especially lethal drone
strikes.
Also, this work could inspire further study of the continued relevance of just war
theory on public attitudes regarding the use of military force. That is, as means of warfare
create more distance between the combatant and the battlefield, future work could
investigate whether fighting and killing with “honor” is still a concern for the American
public. One could consider whether ethical concerns will threaten to curb the
development of remotely controlled military weaponry, which represent a shift away
from face-to-face combat. Conversely, could lethal drone strikes act as a slippery slope
and lower the American people’s standards for ethical conduct in wartime wherein they
opt for convenience and security over moral issues? I suggest these as future paths for
research in order to develop a more robust understanding of how certain factors will
continue to influence Americans’ attitudes about drones as well as how the use of drone
strikes could shape American public approval of the use of military force more generally.
In conclusion, drones’ ability to remove the possibility of American military
casualties forms the foundation for Americans’ high levels of approval. Although these
findings appear to be quite stable, American approval of lethal drone strikes is not
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completely invulnerable, which speaks to the potential for future shifts in public opinion.

72

References
Alston, P. (2010). United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, paragraph 52.
Berinsky, A.J. (2007). Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public
Support for Military Conflict. The Journal of Politics 69(4): 975-997.
Berinsky, A.J., Huber, G.A., & Lenz, G.S. (2012). Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. Political Analysis
20(3): 351-368.
Boyle, M.J. (2013). The costs and consequences of drone warfare. International Affairs
89(1), 1-29.
Boyle, M.J. (2014). The Race for Drones. Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Brooks, D.J., and Valentino, B.A. (2011). A War of One’s Own: Understanding the
Gender Gap in Support for War. Public Opinion Quarterly 75(2): 270–86.
Byman, D. (2013). Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice.
Foreign Affairs 92, 32-43.
Chalabi, M. (2015). What Percentage of Americans Have Served in the Military?
FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whatpercentage-of-americans-have-served-in-the-military/.
Chen, K. (1992). Political Alienation and Voting Turnout in the United States: 19601988. San Francisco, CA: Mellen Research University Press.
Coyne, C.J. & Hail, A.R. (2018). The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with
Mechanized Terror. The Independent Review 23(1), 51-67.
Cronin, A.K. (2013). Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy. Foreign Affairs 92,
73

44-54.
Davis, L.E. et al. (2014). Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security. RAND
Corporation.
Eichenberg, R.C. (2003). Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force
by the United States, 1990-2003. International Security 28(1): 110-141.
Eichenberg, R.C. (2016). Gender Difference in American Public Opinion on the Use of
Military Force, 1982-2013. International Studies Quarterly 60: 138-148.
Feinstein, Y. (2017). The Rise and Decline of “Gender Gaps” in Support for Military
Action: United States, 1986-2011. Politics and Gender 13(4): 618-655.
Fordham, B.O. (2007). The Evolution of Republican and Democratic Positions on Cold
War Military Spending: A Historical Puzzle. Social Science History 31: 603-635.
Fuhrmann, M. & Horowitz, M.C. (2017). Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. International Organization 71, 397-418.
Gallup. (2019). Party Affiliation since 2004. Retrieved from
https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx.
Golby, J., Feaver, P., and Dropp, K. (2018). Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion
About the Use of Military Force. Armed Forces and Society 44(1): 44-71.
Gelpi, C., et al. (2009). Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and
Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hayden, M.V. (2016, February 19). To Keep America Safe, Embrace Drone Warfare.
The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/drone-warfare-preciseeffective-imperfect.html.
Hogan, M. (1998). A Cross of Iron. New York: Cambridge University Press.
74

Horowitz, M.C., Kreps, S.E., & Fuhrmann, M. (2016). Separating Fact from Fiction in
the Debate over Drone Proliferation. International Security 41(2), 7-42.
Hurwitz, J., and Peffley, M. (1987). How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A
Hierarchical Model. American Political Science Review 81:1100-1120.
Jentleson, B.W. (1992). The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion
on the Use of Military Force. International Studies Quarterly 36(1): 49-73.
Jentleson, B.W., and Britton, R.L. (1998). Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American
Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force. Journal of Conflict Resolution
42(4): 395-417.
Jeong, G.H., and Quirk, P.J. (2019). Division at the Water’s Edge: The Polarization of
Foreign Policy. American Politics Research 47(1): 58-87.
Jordan, J. (2014). The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A
Case Study. Journal of Strategic Studies 37(1).
Kaag, J. & Kreps, S. (2013). Drones and Democratic Peace. Brown Journal of World
Affairs 19(11), 97-109.
Kamlet, M.S., Mowery, D.C., and Su, T.T. (1988). Upsetting National Priorities? The
Reagan Administration’s Budgetary Strategy. American Political Science Review
82: 1293-1307.
Kinder, D. and Sanders, L. (1990). Mimicking political debate with survey questions:
The case of white opinion on affirmative action for blacks. Social Cognition 8(1):
73–103; 74.
Knoops, G.J.A. (2012). Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare under
International Law: A Preliminary Survey. International Criminal Law Review 12,
75

697-720.
Kreps, S.E. (2014). Flying under the radar: A study of public attitudes toward unmanned
aerial vehicles. Research and Politics April-June: 1-7, DOI:
10.1177/2053168014536533.
Kreps, S.E. & Wallace, G.P.R. (2016). International law, military effectiveness, and
public support for drone strikes. Journal of Peace Research 53(6), 830-844.
Kull, S. (1995). What the public knows that Washington doesn’t. Foreign Policy 101:
102-115.
Kull, S., and Destler, I.M. (1999). Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolation.
The Brookings Institution.
Kull, S., Destler, I.M., and Ramsay, C. (1997). The foreign policy gap: How
policymakers misread the public. College Park: Program on International Policy
Attitudes, University of Maryland.
Kupchan, C., and Trubowitz, P. (2007). Dead center: The demise of liberal
internationalism in the United States. International Security 32: 7-44.
Larson, E.V. (1996). Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in
Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation. Retrieved from:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR726.html.
Lo, C.Y.H. (1982). Theories of the State and Business Opposition to Increased Military
Spending. Social Problems 29: 424-436.
Lodhi, M. (2016). 110th Plenary Meeting, General Assembly, 70th Session. UN Web TV.
Mueller, J.E. (1971). Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam. The
76

American Political Science Review 65(2): 358-375.
Nincic, M., and Nincic, D.J. (2002). Race, Gender, and War. Journal of Peace Research
39(5): 547-568.
O’Connell, M.E. (2010). The International Law of Drones. The American Society for
International Law 14, 2-3.
Orne, M. T. 1962. On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With
particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American
Psychologist 17:77.
Owen, T. (2013, March 13). Drones Don’t Just Kill: Their Psychological Effects Are
Creating Enemies. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/drones-dont-just-kill-theirpsychological-effects-are-creating-enemies/article9707992/
Perla, H. (2011). Explaining Public Support for the Use of Military Force: The Impact of
Reference Point Framing and Prospective Decision Making. International
Organization 65(1): 139-167.
Prins, B., and Marshall, B. (2001). Congressional support of the president: A comparison
of foreign, defense, and domestic policy decision making during and after the cold
war. Presidential Studies Quarterly 31: 660-679.
Pew Research Center. (2015, May 28). Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks.
Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-continues-toback-u-s-drone-attacks/
Pew Research Center. (2017, November 27). Public split over use of pre-emptive force
against nations that threaten U.S. Retrieved from
77

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/28/americans-are-split-on-theprinciple-of-pre-emptive-military-force/ft_17-11-28_preemptiveforce_publicsplit/
Savage, C. (2011, October 9). Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen. The
New York Times.
Schneider, J. & Macdonald, J. (2016, September). U.S. Public Support for Drone Strikes:
When Do Americans Prefer Unmanned over Manned Platforms. Center for a New
American Security.
Schulzke, M. (2018). Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use
Technologies. International Studies Review 0: 1-21.
Scott, J., and Carter, R. (2002). Acting on the Hill: Congressional assertiveness in U.S.
foreign policy. Congress & the Presidency 29: 151-169.
Sears, David O. 1986. College sophomores in the laboratory: Influences of a narrow data
base on social psychology's view of human nature. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology.
Singer, P.W. (2012, January 21). Do Drones Undermine Democracy? The New York
Times.
Smith, M., and Walsh, J.I. (2013). Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence from
Propaganda Output. Terrorism and Political Violence 25(2): 311-327.
Terrill, W.A. (2013). Drones over Yemen: Weighing military benefits and political costs.
Parameters 42(4): 17-23.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211: 453-8.
Tyson, A. (2017, November 28). Americans are split on the principle of pre-emptive
78

military force. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/28/americans-are-split-on-theprinciple-of-pre-emptive-military-force/
United States Census Bureau. (2018). Quick Facts. Retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218.
Warrick, J., and Finn, P. (2010, March 21). Under Panetta, a more aggressive CIA.
Washington Post.
Zaller, J.R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Zegart, A. (2018). Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and
coercion. Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1439747.

79

Appendix
Consent statement:
You are invited to be in a research study on public opinion. You were selected as a
possible participant because you are 18 years old or older and a U.S. citizen. We ask that
you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the
study. This study is being conducted by Katherine Fink, undergraduate student at the
University of Pennsylvania.
The purpose of this study is to examine your opinions about political events. If you agree
to be in the study, you will be asked to read a few excerpts, and fill out a questionnaire.
The session will take no longer than five (5) minutes. Of course, you can choose not to
answer any question.
There are no major risks in this study. Nonetheless, you may withdraw from the study at
any point. You can contact the investigator if you would like to obtain the results of the
study. If you successfully complete the survey, you will be given a code that can be
entered into Mechanical Turk. If this code is entered correctly, you will be paid $0.50 for
your participation in the survey.
The records of this study will be kept private. We do not collect information that would
allow us to identify respondents. In any sort of report we might publish, we will not
include any information that will make it possible to identify a participant.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to answer
any question in the survey, though we would appreciate if you would answer all of them.
If you choose to withdraw from participating, you may do so, though if you do not
complete the study, you will not be paid.
The researcher conducting this study is Katherine Fink. If you have questions later, you
may contact her at katfink@sas.upenn.edu. If you would like, you may print a copy of
this form to keep for your records. If you have further questions you would prefer to
address to someone other than the researcher, you may contact the University of
Pennsylvania Office of Regulatory Affairs (3624 Market St, Suite 301S).
I have read the above information. I consent to participate in the study.
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Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the following experimental conditions:
Militarily Effective condition:
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes
use missiles to attack targets. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that
the strikes have been instrumental in killing suspected militants and making Americans
safer.
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Strongly disapprove
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences)
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?
Unmanned airstrikes
Manned airstrikes
Militarily Ineffective condition:
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of
American military casualties. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have indicated that the strikes trigger
anti-US sentiment and help militants recruit new members, making Americans less safe.
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?

81

Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Strongly disapprove
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences)
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?
Unmanned airstrikes
Manned airstrikes
International Law condition:
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of
American military casualties. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have indicated that the strikes violate
international law in two ways. First, these organizations have indicated that these strikes
violate international law because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
country where the attack takes place. Second, these organizations have indicated that
these strikes also violate international law because they do not take necessary measures to
prevent the death of civilians.
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Strongly disapprove
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences)
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?
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Unmanned airstrikes
Manned airstrikes
Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition:
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of
American military casualties. Scholars have indicated that the ability to conduct strikes
without risk to American lives will lower the threshold for authorizing lethal military
operations, which could increase the level of American military intervention worldwide.
Also, since drone strikes can be executed with the push of a button, some scholars have
indicated that drone strikes could make it too easy to kill human beings.
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Strongly disapprove
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences)
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?
Unmanned airstrikes
Manned airstrikes
All respondents see the following set of questions:
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia?
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
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Strongly disapprove
Have you ever served in the armed forces of the United States of America?
Yes
No
Is there a significant person in your life that has served in the armed forces of the United
States of America?
Yes
No
I am:
Male
Female
I consider myself to be:
Caucasian (white)
African-American
American Indian or Native American
Asian American
Other
Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin?
Yes
No
I consider myself to be:
Republican
Democratic
Independent
My age is:
18-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
Older than 69
My highest level of education was:
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Didn’t finish high school
High school graduate, but no further schooling
Some college, but no degree
Community College or Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s degree or equivalent
Graduate or professional degree
Have you ever used, or are you currently using, robots at home or at work (e.g. a robotic
vacuum cleaner at home or an industrial robot at work)?
Yes
No
How much have you read or heard about the use of unmanned surveillance aircraft,
sometimes called drones, by the U.S. military?
A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
None at all
Which of the following are unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes?
Global Hawk
F-16
MQ-1 Predator
B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber
MQ-9 Reaper
EA-18G Growler
RQ-7 Shadow
Don’t know
How would you characterize your level of knowledge about drones?
Very high
Somewhat high
Neither high nor low
Somewhat low
Very low
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